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Abstract. Privacy-preserving location-base services (LBS) have been proposed to protect
users’ location privacy. However, there are still some problems in existing schemes: (1) a
semi-trusted third party (TTP) is required; or (2) both the computation cost and commu-
nication cost to generate a query are linear in the size of the queried area.
In this paper, to improve query efficiency, an oblivious location-based service query (OLBSQ)
scheme is proposed. Our scheme captures the following features: (1) a semi-trusted TTP is
not required; (2) a user can query services from a service provider without revealing her ex-
act location; (3) the service provider can only know the size of a query made by a user; and
(4) both the computation cost and the communication cost to generate a query is constant,
instead of linear in the size of the queried area. We formalise the definition and security
model of OLBSQ schemes. The security of our scheme is reduced to well-known complex-
ity assumptions. The novelty is to reduce the computation cost and communication cost
of making a query and enable the service provider to obliviously and incrementally gener-
ate decrypt keys for queried services. This contributes to the growing work of formalising
privacy-preserving LBS schemes and improving query efficiency.
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1 Introduction
The advent of mobile devices and mobile networks triggered a new services named location-based
services (LBS). LBS systems enable service providers (SPs) to provide users with accurate services
based on their geographical locations. Nowadays, increasing number of users use LBS systems to
query nearby Points of Interest (PoI) including shopping centers, restaurants, banks, hospitals,
traffic information, navigation, etc. However, to query a service, a user must reveal her location
to the service provider (SP). Hence, untrusted SPs can profile a user’s movement by tracing
her location, and conclude her personal information, such as working place, health condition,
commercial partners, etc. This raises a serious privacy issue. To protect users’ location privacy,
privacy-preserving LBS schemes were proposed where either a semi-trusted third party (TTP) is
required or the computation cost of a query is linear in the size of the queried area. However, in
practice, it is difficult to find a party who can work as a semi-trusted TTP in LBS schemes, and
mobile devices have constrained computation power and limited storage space.
Considering the above problems, an oblivious location-based service query (OLBSQ) scheme is
proposed to enhance the security of SPs’ services and protect users’ location privacy. Especially, our
OLBSQ scheme provides mobile uses with a light query algorithm which has constant computation
cost.
1.1 Related Work
Due to it can provide accurate services, LBS schemes are becoming increasingly popular. Never-
theless, location privacy has been the primary concern of LBS users. To protect users’ location
privacy, privacy-preserving LBS schemes were proposed.
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1.1.1 Privacy-Preserving LBS with A Trusted Third Party
In these schemes, to protect mobile users’ location privacy, a trusted third party called location
anonymizer is required to blur a user’s exact location into a cloaked area. Meanwhile, the cloaked
area must satisfy the user’s privacy requirements. The popular privacy requirement is k-anonymity,
namely a user’s location is indistinguishable from other k−1 users’ locations. Gruteser and Grun-
wald [11] proposed an anonymous LBS scheme where the location anonymizer needs to remove
any identifiers such as network and address, and perturbs the position data. In [11], the location
anonymizer knows users’ location, and users need to periodically update their location information
to the location anonymizer.
Proposed by Mokbel, Chow and Aref [16], Casper∗ is a privacy-aware query processing method
for LBS. In Casper [16], the location anonymizer blurs users’ exact location into cloaked spatial
areas and a privacy-aware query processor is embedded in the database to deal with queries based
on the cloaked spatial areas. The privacy-aware query processor supports three types of queries:
private queries over public data, public queries over private data and private queries over private
data.
Xu and Cai [22] addressed the location anonymity issue in continuous LBS schemes. In [22],
entropy was used to measure the anonymity degree of a cloaking area, which consider both the
number of the users and their anonymity probability distribution in the cloaking area. When issuing
a query, a mobile user sends his query and desired anonymity level to the location anonymizer,
and then the location anonymizer generates a session identity for the user and contact the service
provider to establish a service session. After a service session is established, the location anonymizer
needs to periodically identify a cloaking area for the user according to her latest location, and
report the cloaking area to the service provider. Furthermore, a polynomial time algorithm was
proposed to find a cloaking area satisfying the anonymity requirement.
Kalnis et al. [15] proposed a framework to prevent location-based identity inference of users. In
[15], when receiving a query, the location anonymizer first removes the user’s identity, and uses an
anonymizing spatial region to hide the user’s location. This framework optimizes the processing
of both location anonymity and spatial queries.
Gedik and Liu [7] introduced a scalable architecture to protect users’ location privacy. The
architecture consists of a model of personalised location anonymity and a set of location pertur-
bation algorithms. In [7], upon receiving a query from a user, the location anonymizer remove the
identity of the user and perturbs her location by replacing a 2-dimensional point with a spatial
cloaking ranger. Especially, users are allowed to specify the minimum level of anonymity and the
maximum temporal and spatial tolerances.
Chen et al. [5] proposed a new scheme to protect users’ location privacy. In [5], redundant
point-of-interest (POI) records were applied to protect location privacy. When receiving a query
from a user, the location anonymizer first generates a k-anonymity rectangle area for the user,
and then sends the anonymous query to the service provider. Notably, a blind filter scheme was
proposed to enable the location anonymizer to filter out the redundant POI records on behalf of
users.
To leveraging spatial diversity in LBS, He et al. [12] first proposed ambient environment-
dependent location privacy metrics and a stochastic model, and then developed an optimal stopping-
based LBS scheme which enable users to leverage the spatial diversity.
Grissa et al. [10] proposed two schemes to protect the location privacy of second users where a
TTP named fusion centre (FC) is required to orchestrates the sensing operation. The first scheme
is based on an order-preserving encryption (OPE) and has lower communication head, while the
second scheme is based on a secure comparison protocol and has lesser architectural cost.
Schlegel et al. [20] proposed a user-defined privacy LBS scheme called dynamic grid system
(DGS) which support both privacy-preserving continuous k-nearest-neighbor (k-NN) and range
queries. In [20], each user generates a grid structure according to her privacy requirement and
embeds it into an encrypted query area. When making a query, a user encrypts a secret key K
and the grid structure by using an identity-based encryption scheme, and sends the ciphertexts
to the service provider. Subsequently, the user generates an encrypted identifier for each cell in
Oblivious Location-Based Service Query 3
the intended area using a deterministic encryption technique, and sends it to the TTP. To process
a query, the service provider decrypts the ciphertext and obtains the secret key and the grid
architecture. The service provider uses the secret key and the deterministic encryption technique
to generate encrypted identifiers for all cells where POIs exist. Later, the service provider sends
all the encrypted identifiers to the TTP. The TTP match the encrypted identifiers from the user
and those from the service provider, and send the same encrypted identifiers to the user. Finally,
the user can decrypt the encrypted identifiers and know the locations of the POIs. Notably, the
communication cost to generate a query is linear with the number of POI in the vicinity and
independent of the number of cells in the grid.
In above schemes, a TTP is required to protect users’ location privacy. However, in practice,
it is difficult to find an entity which can play the role of the TTP.
1.1.2 Privacy-Preserving LBS without A Trusted Third Party
Chow, Mokbel and Liu [6] proposed a peer-to-peer (P2P) spatial cloaking scheme which enables
users to obtain services without the need of a TTP. Prior to make a query, a user needs to forms a
group from her peers via single-hop communication/multiple-hop routing. The spatial cloaked area
should cover all peers in the group. Furthermore, the user randomly selects one peer in the group
as her agent and sends both her query and cloaked spatial region to the agent. The agent forwards
the query to the service provider and receives a list of answers including actual answers and false
answers. Then, the agent sends the answers to the user. Finally, the user filter out false answers
and obtain the actual answers. The P2P spatial cloaking scheme supports two models: on-demand
model and proactive model. Comparatively, the on-demand model is efficient, but requires longer
response time.
Ghinita, Kalnis and Skiadopoulos [9] proposed a decentralised LBS scheme named PRIVE´
where each user can organises herself into a hierarchical overlay network and make service queries
anonymously. Each user can decide the degree k of anonymity and the PRIVE´ algorithm can iden-
tify an appropriate set consisting of k users in a distributed manner. To protect users’ anonymity,
the HILB-ASR algorithm was proposed to guarante that the probability of identifying a real service
requester is always bounded by 1k . This scheme is scalable and fault tolerant.
Paulet et al. [18] proposed a privacy-preserving and content-protecting LBS scheme. This
scheme was derived from the oblivious transfer (OT) scheme [17] and private information retrieve
(PIR) [8]. Each user firsts runs the OT protocol with the service provider to obtain the location
identity and a secret key, and then executes the PIR protocol with the service provider to obtain
the location data by using the secret key. The author formalised the security model and analysed
the security of the proposed scheme.
Schlegel et al. [21] proposed an order-retrievable encryption (ORE) scheme with the following
two properties: (1) it can generate a encrypted query location; (2) given two encrypted user loca-
tions, a server can determine which one is closed to the an encrypted query location. Subsequently,
based on the proposed ORE scheme, a privacy-preserving location sharing services scheme was
presented. In [21], a user or a group initiator should create a group. The group initiator generates a
shared key for the ORE scheme and a shared key for AES scheme. Every user in the group updates
periodically her location information to a database server using the ORE and AES techniques.
When receiving a encrypted query location, the server can search out the exact answer without
knowing the location information. Finally, the user can use the shared key for AES to decrypt the
cipherext and obtain the location information. In [21], a group of users need to share keys prior
to sharing location information.
Hu et al. [13] proposed a LBS with query content privacy scheme based on homomorphic
encryption, OT and PIR. In [13], a user can obtain accurate services, but does not release any
query content information to the server. The homomorphic encryption is used to compute the
Euclidean distance between the attribute vector submitted by a user and the attribute vectors in
the database. The OT protocol was used to find the exact match vectors for the queried attribute
vector. Finally, the PIR protocol was applied to obtain the intended POI set. The security of the
proposed scheme was analysed, instead of formal reduction.
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In these schemes [6,9,18,21,13], both the computation and communication cost to generate a
query are linear with the size of the queried area. This is undesirable to the devices which have
limited computation power and storage space, such as smart phone, tablet, etc.
1.2 Contributions
To protect users’ location privacy, we propose an OLBSQ scheme which can provide the following
important features: (1) a semi-trusted TTP is not required; (2) a user can query services from
a service provider without revealing her exact location; (3) a service provider can only know the
size of a query made by a user; and (4) both the computation cost and the communication cost
to generate a query is constant, instead of linear with the size of the queried area.
Our contributions include: (1) both the definition and security model of the proposed OLBSQ
scheme are formalised; (2) a concrete OLBSQ scheme is proposed; (3) the security of the proposed
OLBSQ is reduced to well-known complexity assumptions.
1.3 Organization
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Preliminaries used throughout this paper are
introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we formally present our construction. In Section 4, we prove
the security of our scheme. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, all preliminaries used throughout this paper are introduced.
2.1 Formal Definition
6. Decommit and obtain a
set of decryption keys .
User:
Service Provider:
1. Setup:
a location structure ;
a secrete key SK;
a set of encrypted service    .
2. Select a start point      in   and a query size    ;
Commit    to be      ;
Generate a proof      : the query area is included in    .
3. 
4. Compute a set of keys .
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(O = (i, j), S = l⇥k) is the area with the left-bottom point O and l⇥k cells. Let D be the services
included in L and D0 be the encrypted services. Dˆ 2 (O,S) stands for the services included in the
area (O,S)
An oblivious location-based service query system consists of the following four algorithms:
– Setup(1`,L,D)! (SK,PK,D0). Taking as input a security parameter 1`, a location structure
L and a set of services D, this algorithm outputs a secret-public key pair (SK,PK) and the
encrypted database D0. The public parameters are PP = (PK,D0).
– Service-Transfer(U(PP,O, S) $ SP(PP, SK)) ! (Dˆ, S). This is an interactive algorithm be-
tween a user U and the service provider SP. U takes as input the public parameters PP , the
start point O and the query size S, and outputs the intended services Dˆ ⇢ D. SP takes as
input the public parameters PP and the secret key SK, and outputs the query size S.
Definition 1. We say that an oblivious location-based service query system is correct if and only
if
Pr
24 Setup(1`,L,D)! (SK,PK,D0);Dˆ 2 D ^ Dˆ 2 (O,S) Service  Transfer(U(PP,O, S)$
SP(PP, SK))! (Dˆ, S)
35 = 1.
2.2 Security Model
The security model of oblivious location-based service query systems is formalized by using the
simulation-based model [3,4,14,19] where the real world experiment and ideal world experiment are
defined. In the real world experiment, there are some parties who run the protocol, an adversary
A who controls some of the parties, and an environment E who provides inputs to all honest
parties and interact arbitrarily with A. The dishonest parties are controlled by A. In the ideal
world experiment, there are same parties as in the real world experiment. Notably, these parties
do not run the protocol. They submit their inputs to a ideal funcationality F and receive outputs
from F . F specifies the behaviour that the desired protocol should implement in the real world.
E provides inputs to and receives outputs from honest parties. Let S be a simulator who controls
the dishonest parties in the ideal world experiment as A does in the real world experiment.
Furthermore, E interacts with S arbitrarily.
Definition 2. Let RealP,E,A be the probability with which E runs the protocol P with A and
outputs 1 in the real world experiment. Let IdealF,E,S be the probability with which E interacts
with S and F , and outputs 1 in the ideal world experiment. We say that the protocol P securely
realizes the functionality F if
|RealP,E,A   IdealF,E,S |  ✏(`).
The ideal functionality of an oblivious location-based service query scheme is formalized in
Fig. 2.
2.3 Bilinear Map and Complexity Assumptions
Let G1, G2 and G⌧ be three cyclic groups with prime order p. Suppose g1 and g2 be generators
of G1 and G2, respectively. A map e : G1 ⇥G2 ! G⌧ is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity. For all g 2 G1, h 2 G2 and x, y 2 Zp, e(gx, hy) = e(gy, hx) = e(g, h)xy;
2. Non-degeneracy. e(g1, g2) 6= 1⌧ , where 1⌧ is the identity of G⌧ ;
3. E ciency. For all g 2 G1 and h 2 G2, there is an e cient algorithm to compute e(g, h).
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2.2 Security Model
The security model of oblivious location-based service query systems is formalized by using the
simulation-based model [3,4,14,19] where the real world experiment and ideal world experiment are
defined. In the real world experiment, there are some parties who run the protocol, an adversary
A who controls some of the parties, and an environment E who provides inputs to all honest
parties and interact arbitrarily with A. The dishonest parties are controlled by A. In the ideal
world experiment, there are same parti s as in the real world expe iment. Notably, these parties
do not run the protocol. They submit t eir inputs to a ideal funcationality F and receive outputs
from F . F specifies th behaviour tha the desired protocol should implement in the real world.
E provides inputs to and receives outputs from honest p rties. Let S be a simulator who controls
the dishonest parties in the ideal wo ld experiment as A does in the real wor d experiment.
Furthermore, E interacts w th S arbitra ily.
Definition 2. Let RealP,E,A be the probability with which E runs the protocol P with A and
outputs 1 in the real world experiment. Let IdealF,E,S be the probability with which E interacts
with S and F , and outputs 1 in the ideal world experiment. We say t at the protocol P s curely
realizes the functionality F if
|RealP,E,A   IdealF,E,S |  ✏(`).
The ideal functionality of an oblivious location-based service query scheme is formalized in
Fig. 2.
2.3 Bilinear Map and Complexity Assumptions
Let G1, G2 and G⌧ be three cyclic groups with prime ord r p. Supp se g1 and g2 b generator
of G1 and G2, respectively. A map e : G1 ⇥G2 ! G⌧ is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following
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the dishonest parties in the ideal world experiment as A does in the real world experiment.
Furthermore, E interacts with S arbitrarily.
D finition 2. L t RealP,E,A be t e probability with which E runs the prot col P with A and
outputs 1 in the r orld experiment. Let I ealF,E,S be the probability with which E interacts
with S and F , and ou puts 1 in the ideal world xperiment. We say that the protocol P securely
realizes the fu cti nality F if
|RealP,E,A   IdealF,E,S |  ✏(`).
The ideal functionality of an oblivious location-based service query scheme is formalized in
Fig. 2.
2.3 Bilinear Map and Complexity Assumptions
Let G1, G2 and G⌧ be hree cyclic groups with p ime order p. Suppose g1 and g2 be generators
of G1 and G2, respectively. A map e : G1 ⇥G2 ! G⌧ is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity. For all g 2 G1, h 2 G2 and x, y 2 Zp, e(gx, hy) = e(gy, hx) = (g, )xy;
2. Non-degeneracy. e( 1, g2) 6= 1⌧ , where 1⌧ is the identity of G⌧ ;
3. E ciency. For all g 2 G1 and h 2 G2, there is an e cient algorithm to compute e(g, h).
Oblivious Location-Based Service Query 5
( (i, j), S = l⇥k) is the area with the left-bottom point O and l⇥k cells. Let D be the services
incl ded in L and D0 be the encrypted services. Dˆ 2 (O,S) stands for the services included in the
area (O,S)
An oblivious locati n-based servi e query syst m consists of the following four algorithms:
– Setup(1`,L,D)! (SK,PK,D0). Taking as input a security parameter 1`, a location structure
L and a set of services D, this algo ithm outputs a secret-public key pair (SK,P and the
encrypted database D0. The public parameters are PP = (PK,D0).
– Service-Transfer(U(PP,O, S) $ SP(PP, SK)) ! (Dˆ, (O0, S,Q)). This is an interactive algo-
rithm between a user U and the service provider SP. U takes as input the public parameters
PP , the start point O and the query size S, and outputs the intended services Dˆ ⇢ D. SP
takes as input the public parameters PP and the secret key SK, and outputs the committed
start point O0, query size S and proof
Q
that the queried re starting from O0 with size S
is in L.
Definition 1. We say that an oblivious location-based service query system is correct if and only
if
Pr
24 Setup(1`,L,D)! (SK,PK,D0);Dˆ 2 D ^ Dˆ 2 (O,S) Service  Transfer(U(PP,O, S)$
SP(PP, SK))! (Dˆ, S)
35 = 1.
2.2 Security Model
The security model of oblivious location-based service query systems is formalized by using the
simulation-based model [3,4,14,19] where the real world experiment and ideal world experiment are
defined. In the real world experiment, there are some parties who run the protocol, an adversary
A who controls som of the parties, and a environ ent E who provid s inputs to all h est
parties and interact arbitrarily with A. The dishones parties are controlled by A. In the ideal
world xperiment, there are same parties as in the real w rld xperiment. Notably, these parties
do not run the protocol. They submit their inputs to a ideal funcationality F and receive outputs
from F . F specifies the behaviour that the desired protocol should implement in the real world.
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simulation-based model [3,4,14,19] where the real world experiment and ideal world experiment are
defined. In the real world experiment, there are some parties who run the protocol, an adversary
A who controls some of the parties, and an environment E who provides inputs to all honest
parties and interact arbitrarily with A. The dishonest parties are controlled by A. In the ideal
world experiment, there are same parties as in the real world experiment. Notably, these parties
do not run the protocol. They submit their inputs to a ideal funcationality F and receive outputs
from F . F specifies the behaviour that the desired protocol should implement in the real world.
E provides inputs to and receives outputs from honest parties. Let S be a simulator who controls
the dishonest parties in the ideal world experiment as A does in the real world experiment.
Furthermore, E interacts with S arbitrarily.
Definition 2. Let RealP,E,A be the probability with which E runs the protocol P with A and
outp ts 1 in the real world experiment. Let IdealF,E,S be the probability with which E interacts
with S and F , and outputs 1 i the ideal world experiment. We say that the protocol P securely
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Fig. 2.
2.3 Bilinear Map and Complexity Assumptions
L t G1, G2 and G⌧ be three cyclic groups with prime order p. Suppose g1 and g2 be generators
of G1 and G2, respectively. A map e : G1 ⇥G2 ! G⌧ is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following
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An oblivious location-based service query system consists of the following four algorithms:
– Setup(1`,L,D)! (SK,PK,D0). Taking as input a security parameter 1`, a location structure
L and a set of services D, this algorithm outputs a secret-public key pair (SK,PK) and the
ncrypted atabas D0. The public parameters are PP = (PK,D0).
– Service-Transfer(U(PP,O, S) $ SP(PP, SK)) ! (Dˆ, (O0, S,Q)). This is an interactive algo-
rithm between a user U and the service provider SP. U takes as input the public parameters
PP , the start point O and the query size S, and outputs the intended services Dˆ ⇢ D. SP
takes as input the public parameters PP and the secret key SK, and outputs the committed
start point O0, query size S and a proof
Q
that the queried area starting from O0 with size S
is in L.
Definition 1. We say that an oblivious location-based service query system is correct if and only
if
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2.2 Security Model
The security model of oblivious location-based service query system is formalized by using the
simulation-based model [3,4,14,19] where the real world experiment and ideal world experiment are
defin d. In the real world experiment, there ar some par ies who un the protocol, an adversary
A who ontrols some of the parties, and an nvironment E w o provides inputs to all honest
parties and interact arbitrarily with A. The dishon st parties are con rolled y A. In the ideal
world experiment, there are same parties as in the real world experiment. Notably, these parties
do not run the protocol. They submit their inputs to a ideal funcationality F and receive outputs
from F . F specifies the behaviour that the desired protocol should implement in the real world.
E provides input to and receives outputs from honest parties. Let S be a simulator who controls
the dishonest parties in the ideal world ex eriment as A does in the real world experiment.
Furthermore, E int racts with S arbitr rily.
Definition 2. Let RealP,E,A be the probability with which E runs the protocol P with A and
outputs 1 in the real world experiment. Let IdealF,E,S be the probability with which E interacts
with S and F , and outputs 1 in the ideal world experiment. We say that the protocol P securely
realiz s the funct onality F if
|RealP,E,A   IdealF,E,S |  ✏(`).
The ideal functionality of an oblivious location-based service query scheme is formalized in
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.3 Bilinear Map and Complex y Assumptions
Let G1, G2 and G⌧ be three cyclic groups with prime order p. Suppose g1 and g2 be generators
of G1 and G2, respectiv ly. A map e : G1 ⇥G2 ! G⌧ is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following
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encrypted databas D0. The public parameter re PP = (PK,D0).
– Service-Tr sfer(U(PP,O, S) $ SP(PP, K)) ! (Dˆ, (O0, S,Q)). This is an interactive algo-
rithm between a user U and the service provider SP. U takes as input the public parameters
PP , the start point O and the query size S, and outputs the intended s rvices Dˆ ⇢ D. SP
takes as inpu the public parameters PP and the secret key SK, and outputs the committed
start point O0, query size S and a proof
Q
that the queried area starting from O0 with size S
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Definition 1. We say that an oblivious location-bas d service query ystem is correct if and only
if
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2.2 Security Model
The security mod l of oblivious location-bas d service qu ry systems is formaliz d by using the
imul tion-based model [3,4,14,19] where the real world experim n and ideal world experiment a e
defined. In the real world experime t, the re some parties who run the protocol, an adversary
A who con rols some of the parties, and an e vironment E who provides inputs to all honest
parties an nteract arbitra ily with A. The disho est parties are controlled by A. In the ideal
world experiment, there ar same parties as in the real world experiment. Notably, thes parties
do not run the protoco . They submit their inputs to a ideal funcationality F and receive outputs
f om F . F specifies t e behavi ur that the desired protocol sh u d implement in the r al world.
E provides inputs to and receives outputs from honest parties. Let S be a simulator who controls
the dishonest parties in the ideal world experiment as A does in the real world experiment.
Furthermore, E interacts ith S arbitrarily.
Definition 2. Let RealP,E,A be the probability with which E runs the protocol P with A and
outputs 1 in the real world experiment. Let IdealF,E,S be the probability with which E interacts
with S and F , and o tputs 1 in the ideal world experiment. We say that the protoc l P securel
realizes the functionality F if
|RealP,E,A   IdealF,E,S |  ✏(`).
The ideal functionality of an oblivious locati n-based s rvice que y scheme is formalized i
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Let G1, G2 and G⌧ be three cyclic groups with prime order p. Suppose g1 and g2 be generators
of G1 and G2, respectively. A map e : G1 ⇥G2 ! G⌧ is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following
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An oblivious location-based service query system consists of the following four algorithms:
– Setup(1`,L,D)! (SK,PK,D0). Taking s input a securi y parameter 1`, a location structure
L and a set of services D this algorithm outputs a secret-public key pair (SK,PK) and the
encrypted database D0. The public parameters are PP = (PK,D0).
– Service-Transfer(U(PP,O, S) $ SP(PP, SK)) ! (Dˆ, (O0, S,Q)). This is an interactive algo-
rithm between a us r U and the s vice provi r SP. U takes as input the public parameters
PP , th start point O nd the query size S, and utputs the inte ded s rvices Dˆ ⇢ D. SP
takes as input the public para eters PP nd the secret key SK, and utputs the committed
start point O0, query size S and a proof
Q
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is in L.
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Definition 1. We say that an oblivious location-based serv e query system is correct if and only
if
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2.2 Se urity M d l
The security model of oblivious location-bas d service query systems is formalized by using the
simulation-based mod l [3,4,14,19] here e real wo ld experiment and ideal world experiment are
defined. In the real world experiment, there are some parties who run the protocol, an adversary
A who controls some of the parties, and an environm nt E who provides inputs to all h nest
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do not run the protocol. They submit their inputs to a ideal funcati nality F and r ceive outputs
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E provides inputs to and receives outputs from honest parties. Let S be a simulator who controls
the dishonest parties in the ideal world experiment as A does in the real world experiment.
Furthermore, E interacts with S arbitrarily.
Definition 2. Let RealP,E,A be the probability with which E runs the protocol P with A and
outputs 1 in the real world experiment. Let IdealF,E,S be the probability with which E interacts
with S and F , and outputs 1 in the ideal world experiment. We say that the protocol P securely
realizes the functionality F i
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The ideal functionality of an oblivious location-based service query scheme is formalized in
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Let G1, G2 and G⌧ be th e cyclic groups with prime order p. Suppose g1 and g2 be generators
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Fig. 1: Th Framew rk of Our OLBSQ Sch me
Let L be a location s ructure (e.g. grid) and O be a oint in L. By (O;S), we denot that he
ar a with start point O and siz S in L. or exam le, if L is a grid syste , (O = (i, j);S = l× k)
is the area onsisting of the l ft-bot o p int O and l× k continuo s cells. Let D be the servic s
inc uded in L and D′ be the enc ypt services. Dˆ ∈ (O;S) stands for t e services included in
th a ea (O;S). Fi . 1 d cribes the framework of ur OLBSQ che e. T e service r vider SP
firs g n r t s a ecre k y SK a some public paramet rs PP , s lects a location st ucture L.
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Suppose that SP has a set of service D, he encrypts each service in D by using SK and its
location information, and obtains an encrypted set of services D′. To query services included in an
area, a user U select a start point O and the query size S, and then commit O to be a point O′.
Furthermore, U generates a proof ∏ that the queried area starting from O with size S is included
in L. U sends (O′, S,∏) to SP. If ∏ is correct, SP uses SK to obliviously and incrementally
compute a set of keys Dˆ′ according to O′ and S, and sends Dˆ′ to U . Finally, U decommit Dˆ′, and
obtain a set of decryption key Dˆ which enable her to access the intended services.
An OLBSQ scheme consists of the following two algorithms:
– Setup(1`,L,D)→ (SK,PP,D′). Taking as input a security parameter 1`, a location structure
L and a set of services D, this algorithm outputs a secret key SK for SP , some public
parameters PP and the encrypted services D′.
– Service-Transfer(U(O,S, PP ) ↔ SP(PP, SK)) → (Dˆ, (O′, S,∏)). This is an interactive algo-
rithm executed between a user U and the service provider SP. U takes as input the public
parameters PP , the start point O and the query size S, and outputs the intended services
Dˆ ⊂ D. SP takes as input the public parameters PP and the secret key SK, and outputs the
committed start point O′, query size S and a proof
∏
that the queried area with start point
O and size S is in L.
Definition 1. We say that an oblivious location-based service query scheme is correct if and only
if
Pr

Setup(1`,L,D)→ (SK,PP,D′);
Dˆ ⊂ D ∧ Dˆ ∈ (O,S) Service− Transfer(U(PP,O, S)↔
SP(PP, SK))→ (Dˆ, (O′, S,∏));∏
is correct.
 = 1.
2.2 Security Model
The security model of OLBSQ schemes is formalised by using the simulation-based model [3,4,14,19]
where the real world experiment and ideal world experiment are defined. In the real world experi-
ment, there are some parties who run the protocol: an adversary A who controls some of the parties
and an environment E who provides inputs to all honest parties and interact arbitrarily with A.
The dishonest parties are controlled by A. In the ideal world experiment, there are same parties
as in the real world experiment. Notably, these parties do not run the protocol. They submit their
inputs to a ideal functionality F and receive outputs from F . F specifies the behaviour that the
desired protocol should implement in the real world. E provides inputs to and receives outputs
from honest parties. Let S be a simulator who controls the dishonest parties in the ideal world
experiment as A does in the real world experiment. Furthermore, E interacts with S arbitrarily.
Definition 2. Let RealP,E,A be the probability with which E runs the protocol P with A and
outputs 1 in the real world experiment. Let IdealF,E,S be the probability with which E interacts
with S and F , and outputs 1 in the ideal world experiment. We say that the protocol P securely
realizes the functionality F if
|RealP,E,A − IdealF,E,S | ≤ (`).
The ideal functionality of OLBSQ schemes is formalized in Fig. 2.
2.3 Bilinear Map and Complexity Assumptions
Let G1, G2 and Gτ be three cyclic groups with prime order p. A map e : G1 × G2 → Gτ is a
bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity. For all g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2 and x, y ∈ Zp, e(gx, hy) = e(gy, hx) = e(g, h)xy;
6 Han et. al
Functionality: FOLBSQ
FOLBSQ is executed among a service provider SP, a user U and an adversary S, and works as
follows:
– Upon receiving a message (sid, service provider,L,D) from SP, store (L,D).
– Upon receiving a message (sid, user,O, S) from U , check whether the message
(sid, service provider, · · · ) was previously stored. If no such message was stored, send noth-
ing to U ; otherwise, send (sid, service request) to SP and receive a response (sid, b ∈ {0, 1}).
Pass (sid, b ∈ {0, 1}) to S. If b = 0, send (sid,⊥) to U . If b = 1, send (sid, Dˆ) to U where
Dˆ ∈ (O,S) ⊂ L.
Fig. 2: The Functionality of Oblivious Location-Based Service Query Schemes
2. Non-degeneracy. e(g1, g2) 6= 1τ , where 1τ is the identity of Gτ ;
3. Efficiency. For all g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2, there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h).
If G1 = G2, e is called a symmetric bilinear map. Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G,Gτ ) be a generator of
symmetric bilinear group which takes as input a security parameter 1` and outputs a bilinear
group (e, p,G,Gτ ) with prime order p and e : G×G→ Gτ .
Definition 3. (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Assumption [2]). Let BG(1`) → (e, p,G,Gτ ) and
ζ
R← Zp. Suppose that g be a generator of G. Given (g, gζ , gζ2 , · · · , gζq ), we say that the q-SDH
assumption holds on the bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ ) if all probable polynomial-time adversarties A
can output (c, g
1
ζ+c ) with a negligible advantage, namely
Adv
q-SDH
A =
∣∣∣Pr[A(g, gζ , gζ2 , · · · , gζq )→ (c, g 1ζ+c )∣∣∣ ≤ (`)
where c
R← Zp and c 6= −ζ.
Definition 4. ( q-Power Decisional Diffie-Hellman (q-PDDH) Assumption [4]). Let BG(1`)→ (e, p,
G,Gτ ), g be a generator of G and ζ
R← Zp. Given (g, gζ , gζ2 , · · · , gζq , H), we say that q-PDDH
assumption holds on (e, p,G,Gτ ) if all probable polynomial-time adversary A can distinguish T =
(Hζ , Hζ
2
, · · · , Hζq ) from T = (H˜1, H˜2, · · · , H˜q) with a negligible advantage, namely
Adv
q-PDDH
A =
∣∣∣Pr[A(g, gζ , gζ2 , · · · , gζq , H,Hζ , Hζ2 , · · · , Hζq ) = 1]−
Pr[A(g, gζ , gζ2 , · · · , gζq , H, H˜1, H˜2, · · · , H˜q) = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ (`)
where H, H˜1, H˜2, · · · , H˜q R← Gτ .
3 Construction
In this section, we describe the formal construction of our OLBQS scheme.
3.1 High-Level Overview
To construct our scheme, we use the grid structure which is described in Fig. 3. The location of
each cell is determined by the coordinate of the point at its upper-right corner. Suppose that all
services included in a cell are encrypted under a same key. Firstly, the service provider divides
the whole area into m×n cells, and then generates a secret key and some public parameters. The
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service provider encrypts each service in a cell by using his secret key and the coordinate of the
cell. Finally, the service provider publishes the public parameters and the encrypted services.
When making a service query, a user selects a start point O = (i, j) and the query size S = k×l
where k and l are the numbers of cells in each row and each column, respectively. The user commits
O = (i, j) to be a point O′, generates a proof
∏
that the queried area (O′;S) is included in L,
and sends (O′, S,
∏
U ) to the service provider. After receiving (O
′, S,
∏
U ), the service provider
first checks the correctness of
∏
U , and then uses his secret key to obliviously an incrementally
compute a set of keys according O′ and S. Furthermore, the service provider generates a proof∏
SP that these keys are computed correctly, and sends the keys and
∏
SP to the user. Finally, the
user verifies the proof
∏
SP , de-commits the keys and obtains the corresponding decryption keys.
Finally, the user decrypts the ciphertexts and obtains the intended services. Notably, to retrieve
a service, the user only needs to execute 3 exponent operations on Gτ .3/26/2018 Google Maps
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/@51.5049652,-0.1437157,14z 1/1
Map data ©2018 Google 500 m 
(0,0)
(%, &)
' ' + ) *
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Fig. 3: Grid Location Model of Our Scheme
3.2 Our Construction
Our OLBSQ scheme is presented in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.
Setup. The service provider SP first divides the whole area L into m × n cells. SP gener-
ates a bilinear group by running BG(1`) → (e, p,G,Gτ ), and then selects its secret key SK =
(α1, α2, β1, β2, x, y, h) where α1, α2, β1, β2, x, y
R← Zp and h R← G2. To encrypt the service Mi,j in a
cell C(i, j) using its coordinate (i, j), SP computes Ai,j = gi1hj1gx
i
2 h
yj
2 and Bi,j = e(Ai,j , h)·Mi,j for
i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 1, 2, · · · , n. To enable each user U to prove that a committed point is in the
whole area and SP to obliviously and incrementally generate decryption keys according U ’s query,
SP computes H = e(g, h), W1 = gα11 , W2 = gα22 , W ′1 = hβ11 , W ′2 = hβ22 , Γ i1 = g
1
α1+i
1 , Γ
j
2 = h
1
β1+j
1 ,
(Ci,1 = g
xi
2 , Ci,2 = g
1
α2+x
i
2 , Ci,3 = e(g, h)
xi), (Dj,1 = h
yj
2 , Dj,2 = h
1
β2+y
j
2 , Dj,3 = e(g, h)
yj ) for i =
0, 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Actually, (W1,W2,W ′1,W ′2, Γ i1, Γ j2 , Ci,2, Dj,2) are used by U to
prove that a committed start point O(i, j) is within L for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 1, 2, · · · , n; while
other parameters are used by SP to computes decryption keys. Finally, the public parameters are
PP =
(
e, p,G,Gτ , g, g1, g2, g3, g4, H,W1, W2,W ′1,W ′2, Γ 11 , · · · , Γm1 , Γ 12 , · · · , Γn2 , ((A1,1, B1,1), · · · ,
(Am,n, Bm,n), (C1,1, C1,2, C1,3), · · · , (Cm,1, Cm,2, Cm,3), (D1,1, D2,1, D1,3), · · · , (Dn,1, Dn,2, Dn,3)
)
and D′ = {((Ai,j , Bi,j)mi=1)nj=1}.
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Setup(1`) :
SP divides the whole area into m × n cells. Let Mi,j ∈ Gτ be the service in the cell
C(i, j). SP runs BG(1`) → (e, p,G,Gτ ). Let g1, g2, h1, h2, g, h be generators of G. SP selects
α1, α2, β1, β2, x, y
R← Zp, and computes H = e(g, h), W1 = gα11 , W2 = gα22 , W ′1 = hβ11 , W ′2 = hβ22 ,
Γ i1 = g
1
α1+i
1 , Γ
j
2 = h
1
β1+j
1 , Ai,j = (g
i
1h
j
1g
xi
2 h
yj
2 ), Bi,j = e(Ai,j , h) · Mi,j , (Ci,1 = gx
i
2 , Ci,2 =
g
1
α2+x
i
2 , Ci,3 = e(g, h)
xi), (Dj,1 = h
yj
2 , Dj,2 = h
1
β2+y
j
2 , Dj,3 = e(g, h)
yj ) for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and
j = 1, 2, · · · , n. The secret key is SK = (α1, α2, β1, β2, x, y, h) and the public parameters are PP =(
e, p,G,Gτ , g, g1, g2, g3, g4, H,W1,W2,W ′1,W ′2, Γ 11 , · · · , Γm1 , Γ 12 , · · · , Γn2 , ((A1,1, B1,1), · · · , (Am,n, Bm,n), (C1,1,
C1,2, C1,3), · · · , (Cm,1, Cm,2, Cm,3), (D1,1, D2,1, D1,3), · · · , (Dn,1, Dn,2, Dn,3)
)
and D′ = {((Ai,j , Bi,j)mi=1)nj=1}.
Fig. 4: Setup Algorithm
Service-Transfer(U((i, j), PP )↔ SP(SK,PP )) :
User: U Service Provider: SP
Selects a start point O = (i, j)
∏1
SP←−−−
H
Generates a proof
∏1
SP :
and the query size S = l × k. PoK {(h) : H = e(g, h)}
Selects r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10
$← Zp,
and computes
E1 = g
−r1gi1, E2 = g
−r2hj1, F1 = g
r3Ci,1, F2 = (Ci,2)
r4 ,
J1 = g
r5Dj,1, J2 = (Dj,2)
r6 , I1 = (Γ
i
1)
r7 , I2 = (Γ
j
2 )
r8 ,
I3 = (Γ
i+l
1 )
r9 , I4 = (Γ
j+k
2 )
r10 and a proof
∏
U :
PoK
{
(i, j, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, Ci,1,
Ci,2, Dj,1, Dj,2, Γ
i
1 , Γ
j
2 , Γ
i+l
1 , Γ
j+k
2 ) :
E1 = g
−r1gi1 ∧ E2 = g−r2hj1 ∧
e(I1,W
−1
1 ) = e(g1, g1)
−r7 · e(g1, I1)i ∧
e(I2, (W
′
1)
−1) = e(h1, h1)−r8 · e(h1, I2)j ∧
e(I3,W
−1
1 ) · e(g1, I3)−l = e(g1, g1)−r9 · e(g1, I3)i ∧
e(I4, (W
′
1)
−1) · e(h1, I4)−k = e(h1, h1)−r10 · e(h1, I4)j ∧
e(F1W2, F2) = e(g, F2)
r3 · e(g2, g2)r4 ∧
e(J1W
′
2, J2) = e(g, J2)
r5 · e(h2, h2)r6 ∧
e(E1W1, I1) = e(g, I1)
r1 · e(g1, g1)r7 ∧
e(E2W
′
1, I2) = e(g, I2)
r2 · e(h1, h1)r8 ∧
e(E1g
l
1W1, I3) = e(g, I3)
r1 · e(g1, g1)r9 ∧
e(E2h
k
1W
′
1, I4) = e(g, I4)
r2 · e(h1, h1)r10
}
.
∏
U−−→
ΩU
For µ = 1, 2, · · · , l and ν = 1, 2, · · · , k,
Let ΩU = (l, k, E1, E2, F1, F2, J1, J2, I1, I2, compute (Kµ,ν = E1g
µ
1E2h
ν
1F
xµ
1 J
yν
1 ,
I3, I4). Lµ,ν = e(Kµ,ν , h) and a proof
∏2
SP :
PoK
{
(x, y, h) :
(
(
Kµ,ν
E1g
µ
1E2h
ν
1
= F x
µ
1 J
yν
1 ∧
e(Cµ,2,W2)
e(g2,g2)
= e(Cµ,2, g2)
−xµ ∧
e(Dν,2,W
′
2)
e(h2,h2)
= e(Dν,2, h2)
−yν ∧
Computes
∏2
SP←−−−
ΩSP
Lµ,ν = e(Kµ,ν , h))
l
µ=0
)k
ν=0
∧
Pµ,ν =
Lµ,ν
H−(r1+r2)·Cr3µ,3·D
r5
ν,3
and H = e(g, h)
}
.
Mi+µ,j+ν =
Bi+µ,j+ν
Pµ,ν
, Let ΩSP =
(
(Kµ,ν , Lµ,ν)
l
µ=0)
k
ν=0, H
)
.
for µ = 1, 2, · · · , l and
ν = 1, 2, · · · , k.
Fig. 5: Service Transfer Algorithm
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Service-Transfer. To make a query, U first selects a start point O = (i, j) and query size
S = l× k. SP generates a proof ∏1SP that he knows the value h which is used to encrypt services.
If
∏1
SP is correct, U selects r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10 $← Zp and commits (i, j, xi, yj , i +
l, j+k) into (E1, E2, F1, F2, J1, J2, I1, I2, I3, I4). Let ΩU = (l, k, E1, E2, F1, F2, J1, J2, I1, I2, I3, I4).
Furthermore, U generates a proof ∏U that the query area (O;S) is within L. U sends ΩU and ∏U
to SP.
If
∏
U is correct, SP obliviously and incrementally computes a set of keys (Kµ,ν , Lµ,ν) using
his secret key (x, y) and generates a proof
∏2
SP that Kµ,ν and Lµ,ν are generates correctly, where
µ = 1, 2, · · · , l and ν = 1, 2, · · · , k. Let ΩSP =
(
(Kµ,ν , Lµ,ν)
l
µ=1)
k
ν=1, H
)
. SP sends ΩSP and
∏2
SP
to U .
If
∏2
SP is correct, U uses (r1, r2, r3, r5) to de-commit the key (Kµ,ν , Lµ,ν) and obtain Pµ,ν =
e(gi+µ1 h
j+ν
1 g
xi+µ
2 h
yj+ν
2 , h). Furthermore, U can obtain the services by computing Mi+µ,j+ν =
Bi+µ,j+ν
Pµ,ν
, where µ = 1, 2, · · · ,m and ν = 1, 2, · · · , n.
3.3 Efficiency Analysis
The computation cost and communication cost of our OLBSQ scheme are presented in Table 1
and Table 2, respectively. By E, Eτ , P, H, we denote the time of executing one exponent on the
group G, executing one exponent on the group Gτ , executing a pairing and executing one hash
function, respectively. EG, EGτ and EZp stand for the size of one element in the group G, Gτ and
Zp, respectively.
Table 1: Computation Cost of Our OLBSQ Scheme
Algorithm Setup
Service Transfer
U SP
Query Retrieve
Computation Cost
(4 + 3m+ 3n+ 4mn)E 16E+ 17Eτ 3klEG + 2(l + k + lk)Eτ (11 + 3kl)E+ (33 + 2kl)Eτ
+(m+ n)Eτ + (1 +mn)P +15P+ 13H 2(l + k + lk)P+ 2klH +(27 + 4kl)P+ (13 + 2kl)H
Table 2: Communication Cost of Our OLBSQ Scheme
Algorithm Setup
Service Transfer
U → SP U ← SP
Communication Cost
(10 + 3m+ 3n+mn)EG+ 12EG + 16EGτ + 36EZp
(1 + 3kl)EG + (2 + 2kl + l + k)EGτ
(1 +m+ n+mn)EGτ +(1 + 4kl)EZp
4 Security Analysis
In this section, the security of our OLBSQ scheme described in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 is proven.
Theorem 1. Our oblivious location-based service query scheme in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 securely
realize the functionality FOLBSQ in Fig. 2 under the q-SDH and q-PDDH assumptions.
To prove Theorem 1, we consider the cases where either the user or the service provider
is corrupted. We show that there exists a simulator S such that it can interact with the ideal
functionality FOLBSQ (simply denoted as F) and the environment E appropriately and RealP,E,A
and IdealF,E,S are indistinguishable.
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In order to prove the indistinguishability between RealP,E,A and IdealF,E,S , a sequence of
hybrid games Game0, Game1, · · · , Gamen′ are defined. For each Gamei, we show that there
exists a simulator Simi that runs A as a subroutine and provides E ’s view, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n′.
HybridE,Simi(`) stands for the probability that E outputs 1 running in the world provided by
Simi. Sim0 runs A and other honest parties in the real-world experiment, so HybridE,Sim0
= RealP,E,A. Simn′ runs S in the ideal-world experiment, so HybridE,Simn′ = IdealF,E,S .
Therefore,
|RealP,E,A − IdealF,E,S | ≤
∣∣HybridE,Sim0 −HybridE,Sim1∣∣+ ∣∣HybridE,Sim1 −HybridE,Sim2∣∣
+ · · ·+
∣∣∣HybridE,Simn′−1 −HybridE,Simn′ ∣∣∣ .
Lemma 1. (Users’ Privacy) For all environments E and all real world adversaries A who con-
trols the service provider, there exists an ideal-world simulator S such that
|RealP,E,A − IdealF,E,S | ≤ 1
2`
.
Proof. Given a real cheating service provider, we can construct a simulator S in the ideal world
experiment such that for any E cannot distinguish RealP,E,A and IdealF,E,S .
Game0: Sim0 runs A and the honest user as in the real-world experiment, hence
RealP,E,A = HybridE,Sim0 .
Game1: Sim1 runs the extractor for the proof of knowledge
∏1
SP : PoK {(h) : H = e(g, h)} to
extract the knowledge h at the first service transfer query dictated by A. If the extractor fails to
exact h, Sim1 returns ⊥ to E ; otherwise, Sim1 runs A interacting with U . The difference between
HybridE,Sim1 and HybridE,Sim0 is the knowledge error of the proof of knowledge
∏1
SP . Hence,∣∣HybridE,Sim0 −HybridE,Sim1∣∣ ≤ 12` .
Game2: Sim2 runs exactly as Sim1 in Game1, except it can retrieve all messages holden by SP.
Sim2 runs A to obtain the encrypted D′ =
{
((Ai,j , Bi,j)
m
i=1)
n
j=1
}
. Sim2 can computes Mi,j =
Bi,j
e(h,Ai,j)
and D = {Mi,j} where i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Hence,
HybridE,Sim1 = HybridE,Sim2 .
Game3: We construct a simulator S that plays the role as A in Game2. S only relays the com-
munications between E and A. When receiving a message (sid, service provider, · · · ), S returns
D to E . When receiving a message (sid, user,O, S), S first checks whether (O;S) ∈ L. If it is not,
S returns (sid, 0) to E ; otherwise, S returns (sid, 1) to E . Hence,
HybridE,Sim2 = HybridE,Sim3 = IdealF,E,S .
Therefore,
|RealP,E,A − IdealF,E,S | ≤
∣∣HybridE,Sim0 −HybridE,Sim1∣∣+ ∣∣HybridE,Sim1 −HybridE,Sim2 ∣∣
+
∣∣HybridE,Sim2 −HybridE,Sim3∣∣ ≤ 12` .
uunionsq
Lemma 2. (Service Provider’s Security) For all environments E and all real world adver-
saries A who controls the user, there exists an ideal-world simulator S such that
|RealP,E,A − IdealF,E,S | ≤ 1
p
+ 2Adv
q-SDH
A +Adv
A-q-PDDE
A .
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Proof. Given a real cheating user, we can construct a simulator S in the ideal world experiment
such at for any E cannot distinguish RealP,E,A and IdeaF,E,S .
Game0: Sim0 runs A and the honest service provider as in the real world experiment, hence,
RealP,E,A = HybridE,Sim0 .
Game1: Sim1 runs exactly as Sim0 in Game0, except that Sim1 extract the knowledge (i, j, r1, r2,
r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, Ci,1, Ci,2, Dj,1, Dj,2, Γ
i
1, Γ
j
2 , Γ
i+l
1 , Γ
j+k
2 ) from the proof
∏
U . Sim1 first
generates a simulated proof of
∏1
SP : PoK {(h) : H = e(g, h)}, and then runs the extractor of the
knowledge proof of
∏
U to extract (i, j, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, Ci,1, Ci,2, Dj,1, Dj,2, Γ
i
1, Γ
j
2 ,
Γ i+l1 , Γ
j+k
2 ). Due to the knowledge proof of
∏
U is perfect zero-knowledge, we have∣∣HybrideE,Sim0 −HybridE,Sim1 ∣∣ ≤ 1p
Game2: Sim2 runs exactly as Sim1 in Game1, except that: (1)i /∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} or i + l /∈
{1, 2, · · · ,m}; j /∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} or j + k /∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Claim 1 If the q-SDH assumption hold on (e, p,G,Gτ ), we have∣∣HybridE,Sim1 −HybridE,Sim2 ∣∣ ≤ 2Advq−SDHA
where q = max{m+ 1, n+ 1}.
Game3 : Sim3 runs exactly as Sim2 in Game2, except that Sim3 outputs (Aµ,ν , Lµ,ν) and
the proof
∏2
SP . Sim3 computes Aµ,ν = g
−(r1+r2)(gx
µ
)r3(gy
ν
)r5gi+µ1 h
j+ν
1 g
xi+ν
2 h
yj+ν
2 and Lµ,ν =
Hr1+r2 · (Hxµ)r3(Hyν )r5 · Bi+µ,j+νMi+µ,j+ν , and generates a simulated proof of
∏2
SP = PoK
{
(xµ, yν , h) :(
(
Kµ,ν
E1g
µ
1E2h
ν
1
= F x
µ
1 H
yν
1 ∧ e(Cµ,2,W1)e(g2,g2) = e(Cµ,2, g2)−x
µ∧ e(Dν,2,W ′1)e(h2,h2) = e(Dν,2, h2)−y
ν ∧ Lµ,ν =
e(h,Kµ,ν))
l
µ=0
)k
ν=0
∧H = e(g, h)
}
. Due to the perfect of the zero-knowlege proof, we have that
HybridE,Sim2 = HybridE,Sim3 .
Game4 : Sim4 runs exactly as Sim3 in Game3, except that the values (B1,1, B1,2, · · · , Bm,n) are
replaced by random elements in Gτ . In this case, the proof
∏2
SP in Game3 is a simulated proof
of a false statement.
Claim 2 If the q-PDDH assumption holds on (e, p,G,Gτ ), we have that∣∣HybridE,Sim3 −HybridE,Sim4∣∣ ≤ Advq−PDDHA
where q = max{m2, n2}.
Game5 : We construct a simulator S that works as A in Game4. S only forward the communica-
tion between E andA. When receiving a message (sid, service provider,D), stores Mi,j ∈ D for i =
0, 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n. Upon receiving a message (sid, user,O, S), S runs the extrac-
tor of the proof
∏
U to extract (i, j, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, Ci,1, Ci,2, Dj,1, Dj,2, Γ
i
1, Γ
j
2 , Γ
i+l
1 ,
Γ j+k2 ). If the extraction fail, S sends noting to U , otherwise, sends (sid, service request) to SP. If
b = 0, returns (sid,⊥) to U . If b = 1, S computesAµ,ν = g−(r1+r2)(gxµ)r5(gyν )r5gi+µ1 hj+ν1 gx
i+ν
2 h
yj+ν
2
and Lµ,ν = H
−(r1+r2 · (Hxµ)r3(Hyν )r5 · Bi+µ,j+νMi+µ,j+ν , and generates a simulated proof. Hence,
HybridE,Sim4 = HybridE,Sim5 = IdealF,E,S .
Therefore,
|RealF,E,A − IdealF,E,S | ≤
∣∣HybridE,Sim0 −HybridE,Sim1 ∣∣+ ∣∣HybridE,Sim1 −HybridE,Sim2∣∣
+
∣∣HybridE,Sim2 −HybridE,Sim3 ∣∣+ ∣∣HybridE,Sim3 −HybridE,Sim4∣∣
+
∣∣HybridE,Sim4 −HybridE,Sim5 ∣∣ ≤ (`).
uunionsq
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Proof of Claim 1. We prove this claim by constructing an algorithm B that can break the
unfogeability under weak chosen-message attack of the Boneh-Boyen signature scheme. According
to the proof given in [1], B can solve the q-SDH assumption.
Suppose that there exists an environment E that can distinguish Game1 and Game2, B can
forge a signature as follows. We consider the following four cases: Case-I. B outputs a forged
signature for i or i+ l; Case-II. B outputs a forged signature for j or j + k.
Case-I. Given (g, gζ , gζ
2
, · · · , gζq , h, hζ), B sets g1 = g and h = h. B selects γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 R← Zp
and computes g2 = g
γ1
1 , h1 = g
γ2
1 h2 = g
γ3
1 , g = g
α4
1 , and sets f(ζ) = (ζ + 1)(ζ + 2) · · · (ζ +m) =∑m
z=0 azζ
z, g1 = g
f(ζ), and fi(ζ) =
f(ζ)
ζ+i =
∑m−1
w=0 bwζ
w where az, bw ∈ Zp and i = 1, 2, · · · ,m. B
selects α2, β1, β2, x, y
$← Zp, and computes H = e(g, h) and sets α1 = ζ. B computes
W1 =
∏m−1
k=0 (g
ζk+1)az = (g
∑m
z=0 azζ
z
)ζ = (gf(ζ))ζ = gζ1 , W2 = g
α2
2 , W
′
1 = h
β1
2 , W
′
2 = h
β2
1 ,
Γ i1 =
∏m−1
w=0 (g
ζ)bw = g
∑m−1
w=0 bwζ
w
= gfi(ζ) = g
f(ζ)
ζ+i = g
1
α1+i
1 , Γ
j
2 = h
1
β1+j
1 , Ai,j = (g
i
1h
j
1g
xi
2 h
yj
2 ),
Bi,j = e(h, Ai,j) ·Mi,j ,
(
Ci,1 = g
xi
2 , Ci,2 = g
1
α2+x
i
2 , Ci,3 = e(h, g)
xi
)
,(
Dj,1 = h
yj
2 , Dj,2 = h
1
β2+y
j
2 , Dj,3 = e(h, g)
yj
)
for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
The secret key is SK = (ζ, α2, β1, β2, x, y, h) and the public parameters are PP =
(
e, p,G,Gτ ,
g, g1, g2, h1, h2, H,W1,W2,W
′
1,W
′
2, Γ
1
1 , · · · , Γm1 , Γ 12 , · · · , Γn2 , ((A1,1, B1,1), · · · , (Am,n, Bm,n), (C1,1,
C1,2, C1,3), · · · , (Cm,1, Cm,2, Cm,3), (D1,1, D2,1, D1,3), · · · , (Dn,1, Dn,2, Dn,3)
)
and D′ = {((Ai,j ,
Bi,j)
m
i=1)
n
j=1}.
B runs the extractor of the proof ∏U to extract the knowledge (i, j, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8,
Ci,1, Ci,2, Γ
i
1, Γ
j
2 , Γ
i+l
1 , Γ
j+k
2 ). If E can distinguish Game1 and Game2, namely i /∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}
or i+ l /∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, B outputs a forged signature I
1
r7
1 on i or a forged signature (I3)
1
r9 on i+ l.
Case-II. Given (g, gζ , gζ
2
, · · · , gζq ), B selects g1, g2 h2, g and h from G, and sets f(ζ) = (ζ +
1)(ζ + 2) · · · (ζ + n) = ∑nz=0 czζz, h1 = gf(ζ), and fj(ζ) = f(ζ)ζ+i = ∑n−1w=1 dwζw where cz, dw ∈ Zp
and j = 1, 2, · · · , n. B selects α1, α2, β2, x, y $← Zp, and computes H = e(g, h) and sets β1 = ζ. B
computes
W1 = g
α1
1 , W2 = g
α2
2 , W
′
1 =
∏n
z=0(g
ζz+1)cz = (g
∑n
z=0 czζ
z
)ζ = (gf(ζ))ζ = hζ1, W
′
2 = h
β2
2 ,
Γ j1 = g
1
α1+i
1 , Γ
j
2 =
∏n−1
w=0(g
ζw)dw = g
∑n−1
w=0 dwζ
w
= gfj(ζ) = g
f(ζ)
ζ+j = h
1
β1+j
1 , Ai,j = (g
i
1h
j
1g
xi
2 h
yj
2 ),
Bi,j = e(h, Ai,j) ·Mi,j ,
(
Ci,1 = g
xi
2 , Ci,2 = g
1
α2+x
i
2 , Ci,3 = e(h, g)
xi
)
,(
Dj,1 = h
yj
2 , Dj,2 = h
1
β2+y
j
2 , Dj,3 = e(h, g)
yj
)
for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
The secret key is SK = (α1, α2, ζ, β2, x, y, h) and the public parameters are PP =
(
e, p,G,Gτ ,
g, g1, g2, h1, h2, H,W1,W2,W
′
1,W
′
2, Γ
1
1 , · · · , Γm1 , Γ 12 , · · · , Γn2 , ((A1,1, B1,1), · · · , (Am,n, Bm,n), (C1,1,
C1,2, C1,3), · · · , (Cm,1, Cm,2, Cm,3), (D1,1, D2,1, D1,3), · · · , (Dn,1, Dn,2, Dn,3)
)
and D′ = {((Ai,j ,
Bi,j)
m
i=1)
n
j=1}.
B runs the extractor of the proof∏U to extract the knowledge (i, j, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9,
r10, Ci,1, Ci,2, Dj,1, Dj,2, Γ
i
1, Γ
j
2 , Γ
i+l
1 , Γ
j+k
2 ). If E can distinguish Game1 and Game2, namely j /∈
{1, 2, · · · , n} or j + k /∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, B outputs a forged signature I
1
r8
2 on j or a forged signature
(I4)
1
r10 on j + k.
Therefore, ∣∣HybridE,Sim2 −HybridE,Sim1 ∣∣ ≤ 2Advq−SDHA .
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uunionsq
Proof of Claim 2. We prove this claim by constructing an algorithm B that can break the
q-PDDH assumption.
Suppose that there exists an environment E that can distinguish Game3 and Game4, B can
break the q-PDDH as follows.
Given (g, gζ , gζ
2
, · · · , gζq , H, T1, T2, · · · , Tq), B will determine whether Tz = Hxz or Tz R← Zp for
z = 1, 2, · · · , q. Let f(x) = (α2 +x)(α2 +x2) · · · (α2 +xm) =
∑m(1+m)
2
z=0 azx
z, fi(x) = (α2 +x)(α2 +
x2) · · · (α2 +xi−1)(α2 +xi+1) · · · (α2 +xm) =
∑m(1+m)
2 −i
w=0 bwx
w, f ′(y) = (β2 + y)(β2 + y2) · · · (β2 +
yn) =
∑n(1+n)
2
ρ=0 cρy
ρ and f ′i(y) = (β2 + y)(β2 + y
2) · · · (β2 + yj−1)(β2 + yj+1) · · · (β2 + yn) =∑n(1+n)
2 −j
%=0 d%y
%. B selects γ1, γ2 R← Zp, and sets g = g, g1 = gγ1 , g2 = gf(x), h1 = gγ2 and
h2 = g
f ′(y). B selects α1, α2, β1, β2, γ R← Zp, and sets y = γx. B computes
W1 = g
α1
1 , W2 = g
α2
2 , W
′
1 = h
β1
1 , W
′
2 = h
β2
2 , Γ
i
1 = g
1
α1+i
1 , Γ
j
2 = h
1
β1+j
1 ,
Ai,j = g
i
1h
j
1
∏m(1+m)
2
z=0 (g
xz+i)az
∏n(1+n)
2
ρ=0 (g
xρ+j )γ
ρ+jcρ
= gi1h
j
1
∏m(1+m)
2
z=0 (g
azx
z
)x
i∏n(1+n)
2
ρ=0 (g
czy
ρ
)yj = gi1h
j
1g
xi
2 h
yj
2 ,
Bi,j = H
γ1i+γ2j ·∏m(1+m)2z=0 T azz+i∏n(1+n)2ρ=0 T cρρ+j ·Mi,j ,
Ci,1 =
∏m(1+m)
2
z=0 (g
xz+i)az =
∏m
z=0(g
azx
z
)x
i
= gx
i
2 ,
Ci,2 =
∏m(m+1)
2 −i
w=0 (g
xw)bw =
∏m(m+1)
2 −i
w=0 (g
bwx
w
) = gfi(x) = g
f(x)
α2+x
i = g
1
α2+x
i
2 ,
Ci,3 = Ti,
Dj,1 =
∏n(1+n)
2
ρ=0 (g
xρ+j )γ
ρ+jcρ =
∏n(1+n)
2
ρ=0 (g
(γx)ρ+j )cρ =
∏n(1+n)
2
ρ=0 (g
cρy
ρ
)y
j
= hy
j
2 ,
Dj,2 =
∏n(1+n)
2
%=0 (g
x%)d%γ
%
=
∏n(1+n)
2
%=0 (g
(γx)%)d% =
∏n(1+n)
2
%=0 (g
d%y
%
) = h
1
β2+y
j
2 ,
Dj,3 = T
γj
j , for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m and j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
The secret key is SK = (α1, α2, β1, β2, x, y) and the public parameters PP =
(
e, p,G,Gτ ,
g, g1, g2, h1, h2, H,W1,W2,W
′
1,W
′
2, Γ
1
1 , · · · , Γm1 , Γ 12 , · · · , Γn2 , ((A1,1, B1,1), · · · , (Am,n, Bm,n), (C1,1,
C1,2, C1,3), · · · , (Cm,1, Cm,2, Cm,3), (D1,1, D2,1, D1,3), · · · , (Dn,1, Dn,2, Dn,3)
)
and D′ = {((Ai,j ,
Bi,j)
m
i=1)
n
j=1}. B sends PP to E .
If (T1, T2, · · · , Tq) = (Hx, Hx2 , · · · , Hxq ), the parameters are distributed exactly as in Game3.
If (T1, T2, · · · , Tq) R← Gqτ , the parameters are distributed exactly as in Game4. Hence, B can break
the q-PDDH assumption if E can distinguish Game3 from Game4. Therefore, we have∣∣HybridE,Sim3 −HybridE,Sim4 ∣∣ ≤ Advq−PDDHA .
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed an OLBSQ scheme which does not require a semi-TTP. Especially,
in our OLBSQ scheme, both the computation cost and communication cost to generate a query
is constant, instead of linear with the size of the queried area. We formalised the definition and
security model of our OLBSQ scheme, and presented a concrete construction. Finally, we reduced
the security of the proposed OLBSQ scheme to well-known complexity assumptions.
Our OLBSQ scheme was constructed on the groups equipped with pairing. Comparatively,
pairing is time consuming operation. Therefore, constructing OLBSQ schemes without pairing is
interesting and desirable. We leave it as an open problem and our future work.
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A Correctness
Correctness. Our scheme described in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 is correct because the following equations
hold.
F1 = g
r3Ci,1 = g
r3gx
i
2 , F2 = C
r4
i,2 = g
r4
α2+x
i
2 , J1 = g
r5Dj,1 = g
r5hy
j
2 , J2 = D
r6
j,2 = h
r6
β2+y
j
2 ,
I1 = (Γ
i
1)
r7 = g
r7
α1+i
1 , I2 = (Γ
j
2 )
r8 = h
r8
β1+j
1 , I3 = (Γ
i+l
1 )
r9 = g
r9
α1+i+l
1 , I4 = (Γ
j+k
2 )
r10 = h
r10
β1+j+k
1 ,
e(I1,W
−1
1 ) = e(g
r7
α1+i
1 , g
−α1
1 ) = e(g
−r7(α1+i)+ir7
α1+i
1 , g1) = e(g1, g1)
−r7 · e(g1, I1)i,
e(I2, (W
′
1)
−1) = e(h
r8
β1+j
1 , h
−β1
1 ) = e(h
−r8(β1+i)+jr8
β1+j
1 , h1) = e(h1, h1)
−r8 · e(h1, I2)j ,
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−1
1 )× e(g1, I3)−l = e(g
r9
α1+i+l
1 , g
−α1
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r3gx
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α2
2 , g
r4
α2+x
i
2 ) = e(g
r3gα2+x
i
2 , g
r4
α2+x
i
2 ) = e(g, F2)
r3 · e(g2, g2)r4 ,
e(J1W
′
2, J2) = e(g
r5hy
j
2 h
β2
2 , h
r6
β2+y
j
2 ) = e(g
r5hβ2+y
j
2 , h
r6
β2+y
j
2 ) = e(g, J2)
r5 · e(h2, h2)r6 ,
e(E1W1, I1) = e(g
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r7
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1 ) = e(g
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r7
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r2hj1h
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1 ) = e(g
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r8
β1+j
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α2
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e(g2, g2)
=
e(g
(α2+x
µ)−xµ
α2+x
µ
2 , g2)
e(g2, g2)
=
e(g2, g2) · e(Cµ,2, g2)−xµ
e(g2, g2)
= e(Cµ,2, g2)
−xµ ,
e(Dν,2,W
′
2)
e(h2, h2)
=
e(h
1
β2+y
ν
2 , h
β2
2 )
e(h2, h2)
=
e(h
(β2+y
ν )−yµ
β2+y
ν
2 , h2)
e(h2, h2)
=
e(h2, h2) · e(Dν,2, h2)−yν
e(g2, g2)
= e(Dν,2, h2)
−yν ,
Kµ,ν = E1g
µ
1E2h
ν
1F
xµ
1 J
yν
1 = g
r1gi1g
µ
1 g
r2hj1h
ν
1(g
r3gx
i
2 )
xµ(gr5hy
j
2 )
yν
= g−(r1+r2)+r3x
µ+r5y
ν
gi+µ1 h
j+ν
1 g
xi+µ
2 h
yj+ν
2 ,
Lµ,ν = e(Kµ,ν , h) = e(g, h)
−(r1+r2) · e(g, h)r3xµ · e(g, h)r5yν · e(Ai+µ,j+ν , h),
Pµ,ν =
Lµ,ν
H−(r1+r2) · Cr3µ,3 ·Dr5ν,3
=
e(g, h)−(r1+r2) · e(g, h)r3xµ · e(g, h)r5yν · e(Ai+µ,j+ν , h)
e(g, h)−(r1+r2) · e(g, h)r3xµ · e(g, h)r5yν = e(Ai+µ,j+ν , h),
Bi+µ,j+ν
Pµ,ν
=
e(Ai+µ,j+ν , h) ·Mi+µ,j+ν
e(Ai+µ,j+ν , h)
= Mi+µ,j+ν .
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Details of Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp be a cryptographic hash function.
An Instance of Zero Knowledge Proof
∏1
SP .
1. SP selects h′ R← G and M1SP R← {0, 1}∗, and computes H ′ = e(g, h′), c = H(H||H ′||M1SP ) and
hˆ = h′h−c. SP sends (H,H ′, c, hˆ,M1SP ) to U .
2. U checks c ?= H(H||H ′||M1SP ) and H ′ ?= e(g, hˆ) ·Hc.
An Instance of Zero Knowledge Proof
∏
U .
1. U selects r, s, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9, s10 R← Zp, MU R←
{0, 1}∗, and computes E1 = g−r1gi1, E2 = g−r2hj1, F1 = gr3Ci,1, F2 = Cr4i,2, J1 = gr5Dj,1,
J2 = D
r6
j,2, I1 = (Γ
i
1)
r7 , I2 = (Γ
j
2 )
r8 , I3 = (Γ
i+l
1 )
r9 , I4 = (Γ
j+k
2 )
r10 , E′1 = g
s1gr1, E
′
2 = g
s2hs1,
Θ1 = e(g, F2)
s3 , Θ2 = e(g2, g2)
s4 , Θ3 = e(g, J2)
s5 , Θ4 = e(h2, h2)
s6 , Θ5 = e(g1, I1)
r,
Θ6 = e(g1, g1)
s7 , Θ7 = e(h1, I2)
s, Θ8 = e(h1, h1)
s8 , Θ9 = e(g1, g1)
s9 , Θ10 = e(h1, h1)
s10 ,
Θ11 = e(g, I1)
s1 , Θ12 = e(g, I2)
s2 , Θ13 = e(g, I3)
s1 , Θ14 = e(g, I4)
s2 , Θ15 = e(g1, I3)
r,
Θ16 = e(h1, I4)
s,
c1 = H(E1||E′1||MU ), c2 = H(E2||E′2||MU ), c3 = H(Θ5||Θ6||MU ), c4 = H(Θ7||Θ8||MU ), c5 =
H(Θ9||Θ15||MU ), c6 = H(Θ10||Θ16||MU ), c7 = H(Θ1||Θ2||MU ), c8 = H(Θ3||Θ4||MU ), c9 =
H(Θ6||Θ11||MU ), c10 = H(Θ8||Θ12||MU ), c11 = H(Θ9||Θ13||MU ), c12 = H(Θ10||Θ14||MU ),
z1 = s1+c1r1, z2 = r−c1i, z3 = s2+c2r2, s4 = s−c2j, z5 = s7+c3r7, z6 = r−c3i, z7 = s−c4j,
z8 = s8 + c4r8, z9 = s9 + c5r9, z10 = r − c5i, z11 = s10 + c6r10, z12 = s− c6j, z13 = s3 − c7r3,
z14 = s4−c7r4, z15 = s5−c8r5, z16 = s6−c8r6, z17 = s7−c9r7, z18 = s1+c9r1, z19 = s8−c10r8,
z20 = s2 + c10r2, z21 = s9 − c11r9, z22 = s1 + c11r1, z23 = s10 − c12r10, z24 = s2 + c12r2
U sends (E1, E2, F1, F2, J1, J2, I1, I2, I3, I4, E′1, E′2, Θ1, Θ2, Θ3, Θ4, Θ5, Θ6, Θ7, Θ8, Θ9, Θ10, Θ11,
Θ12, Θ13, Θ14, Θ15, Θ16, c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9, c10, c11, c12, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6, z7, z8, z9, z10,
z11, z12, z13, z14, z15, z16, z17, z18, z19, z20, z21, z22, z23, z24,MU ) to SP.
2. SP checks c1 ?= H(E1||E′1||MU ), c2 ?= H(E2||E′2||MU ), c3 ?= H(Θ5||Θ6||MU ), c4 ?= H(Θ7||Θ8||MU ),
c5
?
= H(Θ9||Θ15||MU ), c6 ?= H(Θ10||Θ16||MU ), c7 ?= H(Θ1||Θ2||MU ), c8 ?= H(Θ3||Θ4||MU ),
c9
?
= H(Θ6||Θ11||MU ), c10 ?= H(Θ8||Θ12||MU ), c11 ?= H(Θ9||Θ13||MU ), c12 ?= H(Θ10||Θ14||MU ),
E′1
?
= gz1gz21 E
c1
1 , E
′
2
?
= gz2hz41 E
c2
2 , Θ5Θ6
?
= e(g1, I1)
z6 · e(g1, g1)z5 · e(W−11 , I1)c3 , Θ7Θ8 ?=
e(h1, I2)
z7 ·e(h1, h1)z8 ·e((W ′1)−1, I2)c4 ,Θ9Θ15 ?= e(g1, g1)z9 ·e(g1, I3)z10 ·(e(I3,W−11 )·e(g1, I3)−l)c5 ,
Θ10Θ16
?
= e(h1, h1)
z11 ·e(h1, I4)z12 ·(e(I4, (W ′1)−1)·e(h1, I4)−k)c6 ,Θ1Θ2 ?= e(g, F2)z13 ·e(g2, g2)z14 ·
e(F1W2, F2)
c7 , Θ3Θ4
?
= e(g, J2)
z15 ·e(h2, h2)z16 ·e(J1W ′2, J2)c8 , Θ6Θ11 ?= e(g1, g1)z17 ·e(g, I1)z18 ·
(e(E1W1, I1))
c9 , Θ8Θ12
?
= e(h1, h1)
z19 · e(g, I2)z20 · e(E2W ′1, I2)c10 , Θ9Θ13 ?= e(g1, g1)z21 ·
e(g, I3)
z22 · (e(E1gl1W1, I3))c11 , Θ10Θ14 ?= e(h1, h1)z23 · e(g, I4)z24 · (e(E2hk1W ′1, I4))c12 ,
An Instance of Zero Knowledge Proof
∏2
SP .
1. For µ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l} and ν ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}, SP selects ωµ, ψν R← Zp, h˜ R← G and M2SP R←
{0, 1}∗, and computes Kµ,ν = E1gµ1E2hν1F x
µ
1 J
yν
1 , Lµ,ν = e(Kµ,ν , h), Υ
1
µ,ν = F
ωµ
1 J
ψν
1 , Υ
2
µ,ν =
e(Cµ,2, g2)
−ωµ , Υ 3µ,ν = e(Dν,2, h2)
−ψν ,
c1µ,ν = H(Kµ,ν ||Υ 1µ,ν ||Υ 2µ,ν ||Υ 3µ,ν ||M2SP ), c2µ,ν = H(Lµ,ν ||H||M2SP ), z1µ,ν = ωµ − c1µ,νxµ, z2µ,ν =
ψν − c1µ,νyν , hµ,ν = h˜h−c
2
µ,ν , H˜ = e(g, h˜), L′µ,ν = e(Kµ,ν , h˜).
SP sends (Kµ,ν , Lµ,ν , Υ 1µ,ν , Υ 2µ,ν , Υ 3µ,ν , c1µ,ν , c2µ,ν , z1µ,ν , z2µ,ν , hµ,ν , H˜, L′µ,ν) to U .
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2. U checks c1µ,ν ?= H(Kµ,ν ||Υ 1µ,ν ||Υ 2µ,ν ||Υ 3µ,ν ||M2SP ), c2µ,ν ?= H(Lµ,ν ||H||M2SP ), Υ 1µ,ν ?= F
z1µ,ν
1 J
z2µ,ν
1 (
Kµ,ν
E1g
µ
1E2h
ν
1
)c
1
µ,ν ,
Υ 2µ,ν
?
= e(Cµ,2, g2)
−z1µ,ν ( e(Cµ,2,W2)e(g2,g2) )
c1µ,ν , Υ 3µ,ν
?
= e(Dν,2, h2)
−z2µ,ν ( e(Dν,2,W
′
2)
e(h2,h2)
)c
2
µ,ν , L′µ,ν
?
= e(Kµ,ν , hµ,ν)·
L
c2µ,ν
µ,ν , H˜
?
= e(g, hµ,ν) ·Hc2µ,ν .
